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Introduction
 
Since its creation in 2002, the Bagram Theater Internment Facility (BTIF) in Afghanistan (originally 
named the Bagram Collection Point) has come under scrutiny from human rights groups, the media, and 
other civil society organizations for allegations of detainee abuse. More recently though, criticism over 
detainee abuse in Afghanistan has decreased due to greater adherence to the legal prohibition on torture, 
increased dedication to transparency, and the new Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP). 
 
In September 2009, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates created a joint task force (JTF 435) that focused 
on implementing new detention policies and practices in Afghanistan and devoted substantial resources 
toward the effort.1 Changes to the way the military decides whom to hold and whom to release, through 
new Detainee Review Boards, have brought about several due process improvements—although the Open 
Society Foundations remains particularly concerned about the use of classified evidence and the absence 
of legal representatives.2 The United States has also expressed its intent to hand the bulk of its detention 
operations over to Afghan authorities. This holds the potential to reduce Afghan anger toward 
international military forces and civilian personnel, and to ease international criticism of U.S. detention 
policies. 
 
In contrast to these measures, media outlets in late 2009 and 2010 reported allegations of detainee abuse 
at a smaller facility on Bagram Air Base which Afghans refer to as the “Tor Jail” or “Black Jail” that is 
physically distinct from DFIP or the BTIF.3 (“Tor” is Pashtu for “black”). These reports included 
accusations of sleep deprivation, holding detainees in cold cells, forced nudity, physical abuse, detaining 
individuals in isolation cells for longer than 30 days, and restricting the access of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)—all of which raise serious concerns about U.S. compliance with 
domestic and international rules on detainee treatment.4 Media reports and commentators have described 
the facility as associated with Joint Special Operations Command, under the command of Vice Admiral 
William H. McRaven, and Defense Intelligence Agency agents from the Defense Counterintelligence and 
Human Intelligence Center.5  
 
Due to the classified nature of the facility, government officials have not publicly responded to the 
allegations of abuse at Tor Jail. In August 2009, a Pentagon official, answering a journalist’s questions 
about the facility stated, however, that detainees were not to be held at “Special Operations camps” for 
more than 14 days.6 
 
In July 2010, the Open Society Foundations conducted research into the conditions of confinement at the 
facility to determine if the allegations in the media were ongoing and widespread. The Open Society 
Foundations interviewed over 20 former detainees, 18 of whom stated that they passed through the 
facility. Of these 18, half claimed to have been detained as recently as 2009 or 2010 while the facility was 
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 operating under the Obama Administration. The other half stated that they passed through the facility in 
2007 or 2008.  
 
Based on those interviews, the vast majority of the detainees repeatedly and consistently described the 
following types of treatment, many of which appear inconsistent with specific U.S. military rules on 
detention: 
 
•  Exposure to excessive cold 
•  Exposure to excessive light 
•  Inappropriate and inadequate food 
•  Inadequate bedding and blanketing 
•  Disorientation and lack of natural light 
•  Sleep deprivation due to an accumulation of circumstances 
•  Denial of religious duties 
•  Lack of physical exercise 
•  Nudity upon arrival 
•  Detrimental impact from an accumulation of confinement conditions 
•  Facility rules and relevant Geneva Conventions rules/rights not posted 
•  Lack of transparency and denial of International Committee of the Red Cross access to detainees 
 
Given the consistency of the accounts, the Open Society Foundations believes these are genuine areas of 
concern, and not outliers, that run counter to U.S. rules on detainee treatment and the administration’s 
strong public support for Common Article 3 of the Four Geneva Conventions of 1949, which prohibits 
“cruel treatment and torture,” and “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment.”7  
 
The experience of Afghans who pass through this facility also seriously damages Afghan perceptions of 
U.S. detention operations, despite the current administration’s efforts to enact important reforms.  
Afghans interviewed who were detained at the facility claimed that they were subject to unacceptable 
treatment. The implication of this perception is, as the military recognizes, contrary to the United State’s 
counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in Afghanistan. As the Army’s counterinsurgency field manual states: 
 
A key part of any insurgent’s strategy is to attack the will of the domestic and 
international opposition. One of the insurgents’ most effective ways to undermine and 
erode political will is to portray their opposition as untrustworthy or illegitimate. These 
attacks work especially well when insurgents can portray their opposition as unethical by 
the opposition’s own standards. To combat these efforts, Soldiers and Marines treat 
noncombatants and detainees humanely, according to American values and 
internationally recognized human rights standards. In COIN, preserving noncombatant 
lives and dignity is central to mission accomplishment. This imperative creates a complex 
ethical environment.8 
 
 
Methodology 
 
The information in this report is based on interviews conducted in July 2010 with over 20 former U.S. 
detainees, 18 of whom stated they were detained at Tor Jail. Half of those 18 stated that they passed 
through the facility in 2009 or 2010. The interviews were conducted throughout Kabul City and other 
locations outside Kabul Province. The majority of the interviews were conducted in private with the 
assistance of an Afghan interpreter. Each interview lasted between one to two hours, with the investigator 
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 taking detailed notes in the first person. After an initial review of the notes, the interpreter contacted 
several of the interviewees with a small number of follow-up questions. Nearly all detainees asked that 
their identities remain confidential for fear of retribution by the United States, which the Open Society 
Foundations has respected. 
 
The Open Society Foundations has worked on conflict-related detention issues in Afghanistan since 2008, 
with activities including interviews with dozens of former detainees, relatives of detainees, legal aid 
providers, and Afghan government officials. The Open Society Foundations has also toured the DFIP 
(without detainees present) and observed Detainee Review Boards, and is in regular contact with U.S. 
military and civilian personnel working on detention issues, including officials from the U.S. military’s 
Combined Joint Interagency Task Force 435. 
 
 
Main Findings 
 
A. Location and nature of the facility 
 
Bagram Air Base 
The United States military does not publicly disclose the locations of its transitory and screening facilities 
for detainees in Afghanistan. Former detainees interviewed for this report, who described being ear-
muffed and hooded when outside their cells, bathrooms, and interrogation rooms at the facility, often also 
did not know where they were detained. The Open Society Foundations was, however, able to verify that 
those interviewed had been held at a facility located on Bagram Air Base that was physically distinct from 
the BTIF or DFIP.  
 
The location of the facility is not of primary concern to the Open Society Foundations. But knowledge of 
its location is important for ensuring that authorities are made aware of exactly where detainees are 
subjected to objectionable conditions of confinement.  
 
In many cases the former detainees stated that after being held for a few days in isolation cells near their 
initial point of capture they were placed on a plane or helicopter and brought to a second detention 
facility. Most interviewees said that after being held for differing time spans at this second facility they 
were then driven a short distance to the BTIF, indicating that their previous location was located on 
Bagram Air Base.  These detainees also gave corroborating testimony about their conditions of 
confinement, cells and interrogation rooms, and interrogators at Tor Jail. 
 
 
“They drove me outside the base and dropped me off, and that’s when I realized I was at Bagram.” 
(Detainee, 2008) 
 
 
The location of the facility was confirmed by other detainees who, when released without being 
transferred to the BTIF or DFIP, discovered they had been released just outside Bagram Air Base. A man 
detained in 2010 said that after several days at the facility he was put in a car and after a short distance 
reached the main street outside the base. Another detainee held at the facility in 2008 said, “They drove 
me outside the base and dropped me off, and that’s when I realized I was at Bagram.” A man who said he 
was detained at the facility in 2007 stated that when the military released him he was handed over to a 
driver who drove him to the detainee’s home town. The detainee recalled the conversation he had with the  
driver, recounting, “I asked where I was and he said I was at Bagram. He said he has a three year contract 
with the military and when he gets a call he knows to come to Bagram and to pick up detainees.” 
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In the limited number of cases in which there is uncertainty over where exactly the detainee was held, the 
detainees provided similar accounts of their conditions of confinement and treatment. This would suggest 
that 1) they were in fact held at a transit or screening facility on Bagram Air Base, or 2) they were held at 
a separate facility outside the air base where the military employed equally troubling confinement 
techniques. For the Open Society Foundations, the classification and location of confinement is a 
secondary concern to the treatment of detainees at U.S. detention sites in Afghanistan.  
 
“Screening” and “Separation”  
The interviewees consistently described being held in a location where they were interrogated and held in 
small single person cells that prohibited verbal and visual communication with other detainees. This 
strongly suggests that the detainees were “screened” and subjected to interrogation methods described in 
Appendix M of the U.S. Army’s Human Intelligence Collector Operations Field Manual 2-22.3, which 
allows detaining authorities to physically separate detainees from other detainees and the outside world 
for the purposes of intelligence gathering—a technique known as “separation.”9  
 
 
Appendix M in the U.S. Army’s Field Manual 2-22.3 allows detainees to be held in isolation for up to 
30 initial days, and longer upon further approval.  
 
 
The field manual describes “screening” as: 
 
[T]he process of evaluating and selecting human sources and documents for the 
prioritized collection of information based on the collection requirements and mission of 
the unit conducting the screening or its higher headquarters.10  
 
The manual describes “tactical screening,” a specific form of screening, as being:  
 
[C]onducted in support of combat or contingency operations. It can include the screening 
of EPWs [Enemy Prisoners of War] or detainees at the point of capture, the screening of 
refugees, or the screening of local civilians in cordon and search. At the tactical level, 
there is no time for elaborate approach techniques so the degree of cooperation becomes a 
prime concern. Tactical area screening is characterized by rapidly changing requirements, 
the need to evacuate noncombatants and detainees to a secure area, and the need to 
collect priority tactical information while operations are in progress.11 
 
The manual explains that the purpose of “separation” is to:  
 
[D]eny the detainee the opportunity to communicate with other detainees in order to keep 
him from learning counter-resistance techniques or gathering new information to support 
a cover story; decreasing the detainee’s resistance to interrogation.12  
 
The manual also states,  
 
Separation involves removing the detainee from other detainees and their environment, 
while still complying with the basic standards of humane treatment and prohibitions 
against torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, as defined in the 
Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 and addressed in GPW [Geneva Convention Relative to 
the Treatment of Prisoners of War] Article 3 (Common Article III).13 
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B. Conditions of confinement 
  
Despite the government’s insistence that Appendix M meets the minimum requirements for the protection 
of detainees under international law, analysts from the Open Society Foundations have expressed 
concerns with Field Manual 2-22.3 prior to this research, especially with regard to its authorization of 
sleep deprivation, refusing to classify stress positions as torture, and the deletion of key policy statements 
that, prior to the 2006 update of the manual, had informed interrogators that “[e]xperience shows that the 
use of prohibited techniques is not necessary to gain the cooperation of interrogation sources.”14 As this 
report demonstrates, additional concerns with the Field Manual 2-22.3 are warranted.  
 
Open Society Foundations analysts are also concerned with conditions of confinement that appear 
inconsistent with other detention safeguards, such as those found in Department of Defense (DoD) 
Directive 2310.1E (2006), which guided the department’s detainee program.15 Based on the findings, 
rules in both of these documents are either not being implemented properly or are being interpreted in 
such a loose fashion that they make detainees susceptible to mistreatment. As such, conditions of 
confinement at the facility appear to run counter to the UN’s Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment 
of Prisoners and the administration’s publicly stated commitments to treating detainees in accordance 
with Common Article 3 of the Four Geneva Conventions.16 
 
Exposure to excessive cold 
 
? Appendix M explicitly prohibits exposing detainees to “excessive or inadequate heat.”17  
 
? The UN’s Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners holds that “[a]ll 
accommodation provided for the use of prisoners and in particular all sleeping accommodation shall meet 
all requirements of health, due regard being paid to climatic conditions and particularly to cubic content 
of air, minimum floor space, lighting, heating and ventilation.” (Emphasis added).18  
 
Several detainees stated that the temperature in their cell caused them to shiver, made their teeth chatter, 
and prevented them from sleeping. Most detainees recalled that the cold air was coming through a vent in 
the cell, while a small number of detainees stated that the temperature was not very cold. This suggests 
that detention cells may not have a centralized heating system and that each detainee can be targeted with 
climate control. If climate control is not being used, it remains a problem that detainees are not being 
properly protected from cold temperatures. 
 
Each former detainee was asked about the temperature in his cell. The following are some of the 
responses: “It was cold even with the blanket.” (Detainee, 2010); “The room was cold—I was shivering 
with cold.” (Detainee, 2010); “It was hot outside the cell but cold in the cell. I would start shivering when 
I entered the cell.” (Detainee, 2009); “I was shivering cold and ill.” (Detainee, 2009); “It was so cold that  
my teeth were chattering...I couldn’t sleep because it was too cold, even with the extra blanket.” 
(Detainee, 2008); “Cells were very cold and I couldn’t sleep…The cold made it difficult to sleep. I 
couldn’t sleep due to the cold.” (Detainee, 2008); “It was like sleeping in the fridge.” (Detainee, 2008); 
“The temperature in the cell was moderate, but it felt cold before interrogations. I was interrogated many 
times and it got cold almost each time before the interrogation.” (Detainee, 2007) 
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 Exposure to excessive light 
 
? Appendix M restricts the use of excessive light.19 
 
Several detainees described the 24-hour light in their cell as “strong” and had to use the blanket to cover 
their eyes to sleep. 
 
Inappropriate and inadequate food 
 
? Field Manual 2-22.3 prohibits, “[d]epriving the detainee of necessary food, water, or medical 
care.”20 
 
? DoD Directive 2310.1E (2006) states that all detainees in DoD custody shall be allowed 
“adequate food.”21  
 
? The UN’s Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners holds that “[e]very prisoner 
shall be provided by the administration at the usual hours with food of nutritional value adequate for 
health and strength, of wholesome quality and well prepared and served.”22 
 
Detainees described the food at the facility, which was thrown through a small window in the cell door, as 
“horrible,” “bad,” and “smelling awful.”  As a result, detainees limited their food intake, often choosing 
the biscuits over the other food items. Two former detainees stated that their food was supplemented with 
fruit (apples and bananas), but it is unclear if this was done for purposes of incentives, for dietary needs, 
or simply to fulfill a detainee’s request. Whatever the case may be, the baseline food provisions at the 
facility raise serious concerns as to whether U.S. personnel provide the detainees with adequate and 
appropriate food that take into account customary and dietary requirements. 
 
 
“The food was bad. There were some biscuits, and round chips. I had to eat it because I had no 
other option. I could eat only biscuits. I could not eat the other food because it was hard for 
digestion.” (Detainee, 2009) 
 
 
The following are descriptions that former detainees provided about their food: “The food was bad. The 
food was in plastic bags made in Dubai. It had some biscuits and vegetable. I did not eat it because it 
smelled horrible. I ate only some biscuits, but very few. I could not eat anything else.” (Detainee, 2010); 
“I was vomiting because of the food and I was nauseous.” (Detainee, 2009); “The food was bad. There 
were some biscuits, and round chips. I had to eat it because I had no other option. I could eat only 
biscuits. I could not eat the other food because it was hard for digestion.” (Detainee, 2009); “They gave 
me the food that was in a bag; it had two biscuits, some vegetables, and sunflower seeds. I ate only the 
biscuits.” (Detainee, 2009); “It was bad food at Tor Jail, but there was Afghan food and tea at Bagram … 
The food was no good [at Tor Jail]. There were big and small packets. When you opened a packet, it 
smelled awful. There were two wheat biscuits and that’s all I could eat.” (Detainee, 2007). 
 
 
Inadequate bedding and blankets 
 
? Appendix M instructs detaining authorities to ensure that each detainee is not exposed to 
“inadequate bedding and blankets.”23 
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 ? The UN’s Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners holds that “Every prisoner 
shall, in accordance with local or national standards, be provided with a separate bed, and with separate 
and sufficient bedding which shall be clean when issued, kept in good order and changed often enough to 
ensure its cleanliness.”24 
 
Due to the cold temperatures in the cell, many detainees felt the bedding and blanketing was inadequate. 
Nearly every detainee stated that their cell contained one mattress and one blanket. There was no pillow 
and some detainees stated that the blankets were “thin” and “dirty.” A few detainees stated that they had 
to request a second blanket due to the cold. Facility personnel usually gave detainees a second blanket in 
the cases when a detainee requested one. However, given the general restrictions on communication in the 
facility, it is very likely that detainees who needed additional bedding and blanketing may not have made 
the request. 
 
 
Disorientation and lack of natural light 
 
? Appendix M states that “separation does not constitute sensory deprivation, which is prohibited. 
For the purposes of this manual, sensory deprivation is defined as an arranged situation causing 
significant psychological distress due to a prolonged absence, or significant reduction, of the usual 
external stimuli and perceptual opportunities. Sensory deprivation may result in extreme anxiety, 
hallucinations, bizarre thoughts, depression, and anti-social behavior. Detainees will not be subjected to 
sensory deprivation.”25 
 
? The UN’s Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners holds that there should be 
windows in the cells that are “large enough to enable the prisoners to read or work by natural light, and 
shall be so constructed that they can allow the entrance of fresh air whether or not there is artificial 
ventilation.”26 
 
 
“I was interrogated maybe three times. They would walk me shackled, blindfolded, and ear-muffed 
from my cell to the interrogation room.” (Detainee, 2009) 
 
 
?  The detention facility and the tactics used there on detainees leads to significant disorientation 
due to a lack of “usual external stimuli and perceptual opportunities.” It is difficult for the Open Society 
Foundations to know if detaining authorities are intentionally creating an “arranged situation” of sensory 
deprivation. But, without exception, every detainee stated that they were placed in a cell that had a light 
on 24 hours a day and that they were not exposed to daylight. With the exceptions of being in their cell, in 
the interrogation room, and in the bathroom, detainees were walked through the facility handcuffed and 
shackled with their vision and hearing obstructed. They were also not allowed to communicate with other 
detainees. As a result of these factors, nearly every detainee stated that they did not know whether it was 
day or night, the time of day, where they were held, or how many days they spent at the facility. 
 
The following are statements from former detainees demonstrating their disorientation: “I didn’t know 
day from night.” (Detainee, 2009); “I didn’t know the time. I did not know between day and night.”  
(Detainee, 2009); “I did not know the time at all.” (Detainee, 2009); “I didn’t know the time and couldn’t 
tell between day and night.” (Detainee, 2008); “They put me in a cell and I asked for the time and they 
wouldn’t tell me…The whole time I didn’t know whether it was day or night.” (Detainee, 2008). 
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 Sleep deprivation due to an accumulation of circumstances 
 
? Appendix M states that the “[u]se of separation must not preclude the detainee getting four hours 
of continuous sleep every 24 hours.”27 
 
? The UN’s Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners holds that “[a]ll 
accommodation provided for the use of prisoners and in particular all sleeping accommodation shall 
meet all requirements of health, due regard being paid to climatic conditions and particularly to cubic 
content of air, minimum floor space, lighting, heating and ventilation.” (Emphasis added).28  
 
Few detainees were able to provide clear estimates of how often they were awake or asleep due to their 
general disorientation. Many former detainees interviewed stated that the accumulated conditions of 
confinement restricted their ability to sleep, which mostly included cold temperature, loud noises 
(Appendix M expressly prohibits “excessive noise”) and, in some cases, the constant light.29 
 
Former detainees noted: “I wouldn’t be able to sleep well with the light on and the cold. I always covered 
my face to block the light with the blanket, which reduced the light some.” (Detainee, 2009); “Three 
things deprived me of sleep: the cold temperature, the noise, and the pain I had from being beaten [when I 
was first captured].” (Detainee, 2009); “I was in this place for about four days. I couldn’t sleep because it 
was too cold, even with the extra blanket. The light wasn’t a problem for sleeping, but the noises were.” 
(Detainee, 2008); “The cells were very cold and I couldn’t sleep.” (Detainee, 2008); “I couldn’t sleep and 
they switched the room temperature from hot to cold. It was too hot and then I’d be shivering from the 
cold.” (Detainee, 2008); “I couldn’t sleep because of the cold and the dirty blanket and mattress. It was 
like sleeping in the fridge. I got maybe two to three hours of sleep every 24 hours.”(Detainee, 2008); “I 
was there maybe 17 to 18 days… I couldn’t sleep in this cell for more than maybe three to four hours at a 
time.” (Detainee, 2007); “They didn’t let me sleep. They made big noises outside the room and made loud 
noises with a chain. They did it intentionally to stop us from sleeping. Guards made noises, playing with 
each other to stop us from sleeping.” (Detainee, 2007). 
 
Denial of religious duties 
 
? DoD Directive 2310.1E (2006) states that all detainees in DoD custody shall be allowed “free 
exercise of religion, consistent with the requirements of detention.”30 
 
? The UN’s Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners holds that, “[s]o far as 
practicable, every prisoner shall be allowed to satisfy the needs of his religious life by attending the 
services provided in the institution and having in his possession the books of religious observance and 
instruction of his denomination.”31 
 
Former detainees interviewed expressed concern over their inability to appropriately perform their daily 
religious duties while at the facility. Most stated that there was a Koran in their cell and many saw a 
painting in their cell that pointed to the direction of Mecca. While these provisions are necessary, they are 
insufficient. Detainees consistently stated that their inability to know the time made it difficult to offer 
their daily prayers. They were also not provided with appropriate water for ablution, which either limited 
their ability to carry out their religious duties or left them performing tayammum (ablution with dust).  
 
 
“My clothes were dirty and I got to my cell and cried for not making ablution and I prayed crying, 
asking God for forgiveness.” (Detainee, 2008) 
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 Field Manual 2-22.3 specifically prohibits the denial of water as an interrogation technique.32 While this 
rule ensures that detainees do not suffer from dehydration or other medical problems due to a lack of 
water (DoD Directive 2310.1E [2006] refers only to “drinking water”33), it is important to consider that 
water for ablution is a religious necessity that detaining authorities should provide. 
 
Lack of physical exercise 
 
? The UN’s Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners holds that, “[e]very prisoner 
who is not employed in outdoor work shall have at least one hour of suitable exercise in the open air daily 
if the weather permits.”34 
 
No detainees said they were allowed to leave the cell to perform physical exercise. This is especially 
problematic for detainees who are held at the facility in separation for extended periods of time.   
Although the facility’s location and secrecy may not lend itself to easily allowing exercise, practicable 
solutions need to be found to ensure compliance with this international standard. 
 
Nudity upon arrival 
 
? Common Article 3 prohibits, “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment.”35 
 
The majority of interviewees said they were given a medical exam upon entry to the facility, during which 
time they were required to remove all their clothes. This was articulated by several former detainees as 
one of their most humiliating experiences while at the facility.  A man detained in 2009 recalled:  
 
They took all my clothes off, I was completely naked. I refused to do this, but they did it 
by force. They did a medical exam while I was naked and then they gave me my clothes. 
I said this behavior is absolutely inhumane. The translator said the doctor wants to check 
you and I said he could do it without taking off my clothes. 
 
While detaining authorities have a legitimate and genuine need to conduct medical examinations of 
detainees upon entry into a facility, they must balance this with the fact that Muslims and Pashtuns in 
particular, are extremely sensitive about revealing the naked body. Any measures that are deemed 
necessary for medical exams should therefore be conducted in accordance with Common Article 3 so as 
to prevent humiliating and degrading treatment. This should be done by giving the utmost care for the 
religious and cultural norms and sensitivities that accompany nudity. 
 
Cumulative impact of confinement conditions 
 
? Appendix M states, “General controls and safeguards contained in this manual must be applied 
during the use of separation, in conjunction with the safeguards specific to the separation technique. 
Planning must consider the possible cumulative effect of using multiple techniques and take into account 
the age, sex, and health of detainees, as appropriate.”36 
 
? Field Manual 2-22.3 states, “[w]hile using legitimate interrogation techniques, certain 
applications of approaches and techniques may approach the line between permissible actions and 
prohibited actions. It may often be difficult to determine where permissible actions end and prohibited 
actions begin.”37 
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 ? Common Article 3 prohibits, “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment.”38 
 
Department of Defense interrogation rules recognize that for the United States to properly assess whether 
its interrogations are respecting the prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment, it must take into account the accumulated impact of all methods.  The impact that interrogation 
methods have on detainees cannot be measured in a disjunctive manner. 
 
The importance of ensuring that the United States is respecting this prohibition is not only a matter of 
legal deference. The Detainee Review Boards taking place at the DFIP prohibit the submission of 
information and evidence obtained through the use of torture and cruel, inhuman, and degrading 
treatment. If detainees are being held in conditions at an interrogation facility that rises to this level of 
abuse, the information obtained from those detainees should be rejected by the Detainee Review Boards. 
 
Based on the interviews conducted by the researchers for this report, the totality of the conditions of 
confinement at the facility raise serious concerns about a disconnect between detainee treatment at this 
facility and the United States’ stated commitment to the humane treatment of detainees, be it under U.S. 
or international law.  This is especially true for detainees who are subjected to a combination of the 
following treatments:  
 
• Exposure to excessive cold 
• Inappropriate and inadequate food 
• Inadequate bedding and blanketing 
• Excessive exposure to light 
• Disorientation and lack of natural light 
• Sleep deprivation due to an accumulation of circumstances 
• Denial of religious duties 
• Lack of physical exercise 
• Nudity upon arrival 
 
 
Facility rules and relevant Geneva Conventions rules/rights not posted 
The vast majority of former detainees interviewed stated that they did not see posted rules for the facility, 
relevant provisions of the Geneva Convention, or other detainee rights. Most detainees said that they were 
informed of the facility’s rules verbally, but these rules focused on what detainees were not allowed to do, 
such as spitting, or how to ask to go to the bathroom. To ensure greater accountability and understanding 
of all of the rules of the facility—both for the detainees and U.S. personnel—the restrictions, rights, and 
safeguards of detainees should be posted and explained verbally in a language that detainees understand.  
These should include, in particular, Common Article 3, Appendix M, and procedures for reporting 
detainee abuse. 
 
Lack of transparency and denial of International Committee of the Red Cross access to detainees 
United States government officials treat the screening facility on Bagram Air Base with extreme 
sensitivity, refusing to publicly discuss the facility’s location, or acknowledge or deny its existence. This 
void of information leaves room for speculation, which comes at a high cost to the United States’ human 
rights reputation at home and abroad. The Open Society Foundations acknowledges the U.S. policy of 
keeping the location of some of its transit and screening detention sites classified from the general public, 
but the Department of Defense’s unwillingness to explain to the public the purpose of this site and how it 
operates, including explaining what specific safeguards are in place to prevent detainee abuse, is in stark 
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 contrast to this administration’s commitments toward detention policy transparency and the spirit of 
Executive Order 13491 of January 22, 2009, which ends secret CIA detention operations.39 
 
Our research found that, although the specific details about the facility have remained largely unknown to 
the media and international human rights groups, the facility is well-known and discussed among 
Afghans. As such, much of the secrecy surrounding operational aspects of the screening facility on 
Bagram Air Base is uncontainable due to the fact that Afghan detainees who pass through the facility 
routinely share their experiences “downstream” at DFIP with other detainees, and with their friends and 
relatives once released. In other words, the cat is out of the bag, while the insistence on secrecy is doing 
considerable harm to the reputation of the United States.  
 
Two men interviewed who were detained at the BTIF starting in 2003 but did not pass through Tor Jail, 
said that after about two years they started hearing detainees talking about the jail. One man remembered: 
“They were deprived of sleep. Interrogators screamed and banged on the table and walls. Prisoners said 
Tor Jail was like hell on earth. There was horrible food, sleep deprivation. They were given water but not 
taken to the bathroom a lot.”  The other stated that detainees who passed through Tor Jail said, “the food 
was horrible—just some biscuits. They were in small cells without toilets. Prisoners from Tor Jail could 
call to go to the bathroom but the guards wouldn’t come until long after they called. They had one 
blanket, and United States would reduce the temperature in cells to get them to confess.” 
 
The Open Society Foundations is also concerned that all detainees interviewed stated that they were not 
visited by the ICRC while at Tor Jail. This supports a media report from late 2009 quoting a U.S. 
government official stating that although the United States does provide the ICRC with the names of all 
its detainees generally within 14 days, the ICRC was not allowed face to face access to detainees at 
“Special Operations camps.”40 
 
This practice occurs, despite the fact that Appendix M of Field Manual 2-22.3 states that “separation must 
be employed in accordance with the standards in this manual. These standards include the following…. 
Access to detainees by the ICRC.”41 Appendix M also makes clear that this access should be allowed no 
matter where the detainee is held and no matter how long the detainee is subjected to separation. 
Appendix M specifically states that ICRC access applies to “Physical Separation” (which has a 30 day 
initial time limit) and “Field Expedient Separation” (which has a 12 hour initial time limit).42 
 
The benefit of ICRC access is multipronged. It demonstrates a higher level of transparency and 
accountability and allows independent detention monitoring professionals to provide recommendations 
for reforms to ensure proper detainee treatment.43 Recognizing these benefits, the United States has 
increased ICRC access to its detainees. The National Defense Authorization Act for 2010 legislated ICRC 
access to the BTIF;44 and since early 2008, the ICRC has also been allowed access to field detention sites 
in remote areas of the country.45  
 
Executive Order 13491 also states: 
 
All departments and agencies of the Federal Government shall provide the International 
Committee of the Red Cross with notification of, and timely access to, any individual 
detained in any armed conflict in the custody or under the effective control of an officer, 
employee, or other agent of the United States Government or detained within a facility 
owned, operated, or controlled by a department or agency of the United States 
Government, consistent with Department of Defense regulations and policies.46  
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 It remains, however, that ICRC access at the screening facility on Bagram Air Base is too restrictive. 
While obstacles to ICRC access may arise from insurmountable logistical constraints or security 
concerns, given that the ICRC is allowed access to field detention sites and the DFIP (and previously the 
BTIF), it seems both appropriate and possible that the United States should grant the ICRC full access to 
this facility, especially given the circumstances of confinement described in this paper. Providing the 
ICRC only with detainee names in Afghanistan is no substitute for allowing the ICRC to visit the facility, 
regularly talk to detainees in private, and understand how the facility “lives and breathes” with detainees 
held there.  
 
 
Recommendations 
 
Based on our findings, the following minimum measures are necessary to ensure compliance with U.S. 
and international legal obligations relevant to the humane treatment of detainees and the administration’s 
public commitment to greater transparency in detention operations in Afghanistan. In some cases, these 
recommendations can be immediately implemented. In other cases, it may be necessary for the 
Department of Defense to make dramatic structural adjustments to the facility, or build a new facility that 
meets international detention standards. 
 
1. Conduct a thorough investigation into confinement conditions at the screening facility on Bagram 
Air Base. Determine if conditions are in accordance with Department of Defense interrogation and 
detainee treatment rules; and determine if Department of Defense rules, including Appendix M, need to 
be changed or clarified to ensure proper compliance with international and domestic detainee treatment 
standards.   
 
2. Cease exposing detainees to excessive temperatures and ensure that temperature is not used as a 
tool for interrogation. If not already done so, put in place a central heating system to restrict the potential 
for abuse.  
 
3. Cease exposing detainees to 24 hours of excessive light in their cells. 
 
4. Provide detainees with regular access to natural light. 
 
5. Provide detainees with information about their general location, date, and time of day on a regular 
basis. 
 
6. Provide detainees with appropriate and adequate food and water, taking into consideration the 
health conditions of each detainee and their cultural and religious customs. Inform detainees that they can 
request additional food and water without reprisal. 
 
7. Provide detainees with appropriate and clean bedding and blanketing, taking into consideration 
the health conditions of each detainee. Inform detainees that they can request additional bedding and 
blanketing without reprisal.  
 
8. Provide an environment where detainees do not suffer from sleep deprivation. 
 
9. Ensure that detainees are capable of observing their religious duties, by supplementing current 
policies (such as providing detainees with the direction of Mecca and a Koran) with providing detainees 
with water for ablution and the time of day and/or announcing prayer time. Inform detainees that they can 
request additional water for ablution without reprisal. 
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10. Provide detainees with at least one hour of exercise per day. 
 
11. Ensure that detainees are not exposed to humiliating forms of nudity, including during medical 
examinations. The number of people who see the detainee nude during the exam should be limited only to 
the medical professional. Translators and non-medical military personnel in the room should have their 
view blocked. 
 
12. Post the facility’s rules, interrogation rules, and relevant Geneva Conventions rules/rights in 
languages that the detainees can understand. If detainees are unable to read, these rules and rights should 
be provided to them verbally in a language they can understand. 
 
13. Increase transparency of the facility by explaining to the public the purpose of transit and 
screening detention sites and how they operate, including explaining what specific safeguards are in place 
to prevent detainee abuse. 
 
14. Place the facility under the command of Combined Joint Interagency Task Force 435 to ensure 
continuity in detention policies and oversight and to establish greater transparency. 
 
15. Allow the ICRC to monitor the screening facility and have access to the detainees at the facility 
on a regular basis. 
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